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Observing Unexpected Patterns in Cross-National Research: Blame Data, Theory, or Both? 
Attitudes toward Redistributive Taxation in Thirty-Three Countries
1 
Abstract 
This article examines the relationships between socioeconomic status and attitudes toward redistributive 
taxation across 33 countries using the complete International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2006 data 
set. We apply a simple rational-choice-inspired homo-economicus hypothesis proposing that those better off 
in the socioeconomic hierarchy should have less reason to support state-organized economic redistribution 
compared to those situated at lower levels in the socioeconomic hierarchy. The empirical results 
demonstrate substantial cross-country variation regarding the correspondence between empirical 
observations and theoretical expectations. When faced with such tremendous cross-national variation in 
response patterns, a common strategy among researchers is to question the quality of the data collection 
procedures for those countries deviating strongly from theoretical expectations. The strategy chosen in this 
study is, however, different. The main argument is that an observed lack of fit between theory and empirical 
observations may be rooted in problems related to theory rather than the quality of data collection 
procedures. Building on previous research, two “cultural distance” hypotheses are formulated, both of which 
argue that the correspondence between the homo-economicus theory and empirics should indeed vary 
systematically across countries. The first focuses on the role of the welfare state and the second on the 
level of economic affluence and associated scientific dominance. Both hypotheses receive considerable 
empirical support. The relationship between socioeconomic status and support for redistributive taxation is 
substantially stronger in the wealthy Western welfare states—particularly among those of Northern 
Europe—than in the poor non-Western countries lacking any institutional design reminiscent of a welfare 
state.  
Keywords: attitudes; international comparative research; ISSP; latent class analysis; taxation  
Introduction 
International comparisons are seldom easy; even seemingly straightforward concepts such as income 
distribution or gross domestic product (GDP) can be very difficult to compare across countries. The 
difficulties encountered are no less significant when it comes to attitudes and values. This study deals with 
attitudes toward taxation across 33 countries. A very simple— some may even say “common sense”—
rational choice-based theory on the relationships between socioeconomic position and preferences for 
state-organized economic redistribution says that the higher the socioeconomic position, the lower the 
probability for supporting redistributive taxation.  
Now, let us assume that this hypothesis is empirically tested using data from a fairly large number of 
countries, and that the results indicate tremendous cross-national variation. In some countries the expected 
pattern is clearly visible, while in other countries the observed relationship is close to zero, or even worse, 
inverted. In other words, the predictive power of the theory differs substantially across countries. Faced with 
such a result, the dilemma to be solved is the following: is the lack of fit between theory and the empirical 
results that can be observed in some countries rooted in data of insufficient quality or to qualities related to 
the theory itself, that is, that the theory is more valid in some countries than in others?  
While researchers may respond differently to this dilemma, the first step is often to focus on the data. Some 
may take the easiest way out, simply not using the countries where the most unexpected results appear. In 
fact, based on informal conversations with scholars involved in comparative attitudinal research, this 
response is far from uncommon. Another response is to report the statistical properties of the observed 
associations and basically argue that the data for the deviant countries are of bad quality (Blasius and 
Thiessen 2006). A third response is to examine the quality of data in-depth by applying different measures, 
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such as translation checks and sample coverages.2 Another strategy is to redefine and modify theory. In this 
study, we will approach the dilemma mainly from this “theory quality” perspective.3 
Our basic argument is that we should indeed expect that the strength of the relationship between attitudes 
toward redistributive taxation and socioeconomic position varies systematically across countries. In short, 
the relationship should be more pronounced in large welfare states compared to small welfare states. In 
countries lacking any institutional design reminiscent of a welfare state, the discrepancy between empirics 
and theoretical expectations should be particularly pronounced. 
Furthermore, the relationship is expected to be stronger among the wealthy industrialized countries than in 
the less prosperous countries outside the Western World. These hypotheses are tested on data covering 33 
countries collected in 2006 within the framework of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).  
Socioeconomic Status and Attitudes toward Redistributive Taxation: Why should Relationships 
Differ Systematically across Countries? 
A Western Bias in Cross-National Research?  
Wallerstein (1997) argues that the academic field of the social sciences is a product of the modern world-
system of which the choice of subject matter, its theorizing, its methodology, and its epistemology reflect the 
context in which it was born. It is true that all large contemporary international social surveys have their 
roots in the Western World—Europe or the United States. Therefore, the leading and well-established 
theories as well as the corresponding measurements tend to be designed from a Western perspective.4 
Some of the problems associated with applying the same measurements across countries have been 
recognized by methodologically oriented scholars.5 Of particular interest in the context of this article is the 
cultural distance hypothesis formulated by Blasius and Thiessen: “The greater the cultural distance between 
the origin of a survey instrument and the groups being investigated, the more compromised the data quality 
and comparability is likely to be” (2012, 5).  
We find the concept of cultural distance potentially fruitful. However, there are two issues that need to be 
discussed. First, while the hypothesis proposes that problems of comparability may be related to data of 
insufficient quality and/or to nonvalid theoretical assumptions, the research upon which the hypothesis is 
founded has principally emphasized explanations relating to the quality of data and not on possible 
errors/fallacies related to theory (Blasius and Thiessen 2006; 2012). Second, “culture” is a notoriously 
slippery concept. There simply is no general and widely accepted understanding of the concept. However, 
given the research field within which the cultural distance hypothesis was developed, it seems appropriate 
to concentrate on theoretically relevant country characteristics that can be seen as “cultural markers,” 
defining the degree of similarity/difference between countries.  
In our search for such indicators, we have benefitted from insights provided by the historical institutionalism 
school (Rothstein and Steinmo 2002; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992) as well as from world-systems 
theory (Wallerstein 1997), and modernization theory (Wilensky 2002). As will be elaborated below, we have 
selected two types of country-level indicators: the size of the welfare state and the level of economic 
development.  
Explaining Cross-National Variation: The Roles of the Welfare State and Economic Development  
Let us begin with the assumed general negative relationship between socioeconomic status and support for 
state-organized economic redistribution. Following the theory specified by the power resources approach 
(Korpi 2006; Korpi and Palme 2003), it is suggested that those in weak bargaining positions in the labor 
market will prefer to locate societal bargaining in parliamentary politics compared to staying within a market 
relationship. In terms of power, the democratic principle of “one person–one vote” in politics never did and 
still does not have a counterpart when it comes to relations between labor and capital in Western societies.  
Furthermore, if parliamentary representation is obtained, it is expected that those with relatively few market-
derived resources will favor redistribution of income by means of state-organized policy, while those in more 
privileged positions will prefer a larger role for the market–property nexus in distributive processes. From a 
rational choice point of view, those at the lower end of the socioeconomic status ladder should have 
                                                        
2 An example of an empirically generated theory based on a translation mistake was recently reported by Charles 
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3 Having said that, we will of course not completely ignore focusing on measurement errors related to data. However, we 
will restrict our attention to the countries displaying the most aberrant response patterns. 
4 The attitudinal items used in this study have also been constructed through a Western lens. They actually appeared in 
the first ISSP survey back in 1985, many years before countries from the non-Western world joined the program. 
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stronger reasons for supporting state-organized economic redistribution compared to those located at the 
upper level. In other words, support for redistribution should come from the poor and resistance from the 
rich. Corneo and Grüner call this the “homo-economicus effect” (2002, 85), which is also the basic 
assumption of our first hypothesis (H1).  
Hypothesis 1: The lower the socioeconomic status, the stronger the support for redistributive taxation.  
Why should we expect that the relationships between socioeconomic position and support for state-
organized economic redistribution vary systematically across countries?6 It is important to recognize the 
underlying assumptions in the homo-economicus approach: that citizens in general perceive the state-
organized systems of taxation and social spending as a class-relevant and efficient apparatus for leveling 
out market-generated economic inequalities. We propose that the validity of these assumptions differs 
across countries. In short, the probability that these conditions are fulfilled is significantly higher in a large 
extensive welfare state context, such as in the encompassing Scandinavian welfare states, compared to in 
a less extensive welfare state, for example, the American or the Australian welfare states, let alone in 
countries lacking any institutional setup reminiscent of a welfare state. Why?  
The starting point is that the political-institutional framework surrounding citizens in a given context (e.g., 
country) is of substantial importance for structuring citizens’ perceptions, preferences, and behaviors 
(Mettler and Soss 2004; Soss and Schram 2007; Svallfors 2007). As transmitters of resources and carriers 
of norms, state policy arrangements can be understood as a filter that delineates both opportunities and 
constraints, and through which people perceive the world (Öun 2012). In relation to the topic in this study, 
the following arguments can be applied.  
First, the redistributive capacity of the welfare state is determined by the tax system and social spending 
priorities. The redistributive capacity of the tax system is primarily determined by the size of the total tax 
revenue. Also, the larger the budget available for social spending, the larger the redistributive capacity of 
the state (Åberg 1989; Edlund 1999; Edlund and Åberg 2002; OECD 1990).  
Empirical evidence clearly shows that the larger the welfare state—irrespective of measures used—the 
higher the redistributive capacity of the welfare state. Different types of output indicators that have been 
applied for capturing the size of the welfare state—“total tax revenue/ GDP” or “total social 
spending/GDP”—are all highly correlated with more direct measures of welfare policy design. The higher 
the prevalence of universal/encompassing social insurance programs, the higher the levels of taxation and 
social spending. And, importantly, all of these measures are strongly correlated with the redistributive 
capacity of the welfare state (Edlund 2007; Edlund and Lindh 2015; Korpi and Palme 1998).  
Second, in a large encompassing welfare state, the systems of taxation and social spending involve a 
comparatively larger proportion of the citizenry—and their resources—than in relatively residual welfare 
states. Thus, the size of the welfare state determines not only its redistributive capacity but also the extent 
of its influence on citizens’ everyday lives: citizens in more encompassing welfare states pay a larger share 
of their income in taxes and their livelihood is also more dependent on services and social protection 
provided by the welfare state (Edlund 2007). For these reasons, citizens in encompassing welfare states 
are likely to develop a stronger sense of “ownership” of the state and perceive stronger incentives for being 
politically involved than citizens in meager welfare states (Persson and Rothstein 2015). To put it somewhat 
differently, rational voters should be interested in both knowing and trying to influence how tax money is 
collected and spent—and their interests in policy changes (toward a less ambitious or more ambitious 
welfare state depending on their location in the class structure) should be stronger among citizens living in a 
large welfare state compared to those living in a small one. 
Third, arguments similar to the above apply to the extent to which the welfare state should attract attention 
from organized interests, such as political parties. Organized interests are important for underpinning 
collective memories and worldviews among citizens (Rothstein 2000). By framing public debate and by 
offering citizens mental tools and guidelines for interpretations of “problems of” and “solutions to” any given 
issue, organized interests attempt to gain public acceptance of and support for needed action and are, 
therefore, powerful forces in the processes of attitude formation (Edlund 2007; Svallfors 2006).  
In sum, the strength of the link between socioeconomic position and attitudes toward state-organized 
redistribution is shaped by the redistributive capacity of the welfare state as well as the centrality of the 
welfare state in political articulation both at the level of organized interests and among ordinary citizens—
factors that are all influenced by the size of the welfare state. Based on the arguments above, dealing with 
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institutional feedback effects on public opinion, our second hypothesis (H2) proposes that the predictive 
power of the above mentioned rational choice-based homo-economicus theory will increase with the size of 
the welfare state. In countries lacking any institutional design reminiscent of a welfare state, the discrepancy 
between empirics and theoretical expectations will be particularly pronounced:  
Hypothesis 2: The more encompassing the welfare state, the stronger the correlation between 
socioeconomic status and redistributive taxation in the direction as formulated in H1.  
Let us now return to the essential implication of the arguments provided by world-systems theory referred to 
above, regarding the assumed Western-centered dominance in research (Wallerstein 1997). Using the 
terminology of Wallerstein, it can be hypothesized that the predictive power of the homo-economicus theory 
should be stronger among the core countries (the wealthy industrial societies in the Western world) 
compared to the semiperiphery and periphery countries (the less developed countries located outside the 
Western world). However, in the perspective of this article, we believe that this three-category classification 
schema is somewhat too broad and therefore not well-suited as an empirical measure because it is 
insensitive to systematic variation within the groups of core, semiperiphery, and periphery countries. We 
find it more fruitful to use a more fine-grained measure of societal development than is offered by the world-
systems theory. In our view, it is more appropriate to use the standard indicator of a country’s level of 
industrialization/economic development (Wilensky 2002): GDP per capita. Therefore, the hypothesis is 
stated as follows:  
Hypothesis 3: The higher the level of economic development in a country, the stronger the correlation 
between socioeconomic status and redistributive taxation in the direction as formulated in H1. 
Data, Methods, and Variables  
The individual level data come from the 2006 Role of Government module of the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP). Each country has provided a national representative random sample of the adult 
population with a minimum of 1,000 cases.7 All countries included in the international ISSP Role of 
Government IV data file are included in the analysis. They vary greatly in relation to geographical belonging, 
cultural and historical backgrounds, levels of affluence, and welfare state institutional configurations. The 
Northern countries of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway are all characterized by high levels of 
affluence and encompassing large welfare states. Germany, Switzerland, France, and the Netherlands 
represent affluent continental West European welfare states. The affluent Anglo-American countries: the 
United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Great Britain, are, compared to the above countries, 
characterized by having rather meager welfare states. While all of the above-mentioned countries are well-
known research objects within the field of welfare state research (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1992; Korpi and 
Palme 1998), our analysis also covers a number of countries that are less often used in comparative 
research. From the Western part of Europe, we include the less affluent South European countries of Spain 
and Portugal, as well as Ireland—all characterized by rather limited welfare states and strong influences of 
the Catholic Church (Ferrera 1996). When it comes to the former communist countries of Eastern Europe, 
data are available for Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Hungary, Russia, and Croatia; from the 
South American continent: Chile, Uruguay, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela; from Asia: South 
Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Israel. And finally, the only country from the African continent for 
which data are available is South Africa.  
The measures of attitudes toward taxation are based on the following two items: Generally, how would you 
describe taxes in [country] today? (We mean all taxes together, including wage deductions, income tax, tax 
on goods and services, and all the rest.)  
For those with high incomes, are taxes R  
For those with low incomes, are taxes R  
Answer scale: much too high/too high/about right/too low/much too low?  
Both variables have been recoded into three response categories: Taxes are too high; Taxes are about 
right; Taxes are too low.  
To make sense of the different combinations of responses that people may give to the two above items, it is 
appropriate to use a method that has the ability to identify the most common or dominant patterns that exist 
in the data. For this purpose we have decided to use latent class analysis (LCA). LCA is particularly well-
suited for analyzing nonlinear relationships between categorical variables. The assumption of local 
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Study Monitoring Report (Scholz et al. 2008). 
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independence is fundamental to LCA: the total associations between observed variables are entirely 
explained by an unobserved (latent) variable. LCA distinguishes common preference constellations in the 
data, and all respondents sharing similar preferences-structures will be allocated to a specific cluster 
(Hagenaars and Halman 1989). If two dominant types exist among citizens—for example, those preferring a 
more progressive distribution of taxes vis-à-vis those wanting a more regressive distribution of taxes—a 
two-cluster model will fit the data. If citizens can be divided into three groups, a three-cluster model will be 
selected, and so on. The number of dominant preference constellations (clusters) can be determined by 
applying different model-fit statistics. A very desirable feature of LCA is its ability to calculate the probability 
for each individual to belong to each cluster, making it possible to estimate the impact of various 
background variables on individual-level cluster membership probabilities (Magidson and Vermunt 2003).8 
These probabilities will be used as continuous dependent variables in forthcoming ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions, where the relationships between socioeconomic status and attitudes toward taxation will 
be analyzed.  
In the first step of the analysis, a series of exploratory models is tested against the weighted data. Each 
model includes the two manifest tax variables—entered as nominal scale level variables in order to be able 
to distinguish nonlinear response patterns in the data—and country as a nominal-level covariate. While the 
effect of country is allowed to vary across clusters, all effects between the covariate “country” and the two 
manifest indicators are set to zero. This means: (a) that the characteristics of each cluster should be 
identical across countries, and (b) that cluster membership probabilities can vary across countries.  
Moving to the independent variables that will be used in the analysis for testing H1, the main variable is 
socioeconomic status, which is an additive index standardized to vary between 0 and 100. It is based on 
three variables: Occupational Status, Education, and Family Income.  
The first component in the socioeconomic index is the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational 
Status (ISEI) (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman 1992), which is based on ISCO88.9 ISEI is rescaled in 
order to range between 0 and 100. The second component is education, where we have applied the 
standardized educational attainment level that is available in the ISSP background variable setup. This 
variable, containing six categories rescaled to range between 0 and 100, is derived from the national-
specific variable asking for the respondents’ highest completed level of education. The third component is 
equivalence income, which is family income weighted by household size, converted into percentiles. The 
weight equation used was:  
Equivalence income = family income/ (household size * 0.73) (DAE 1998). 
All three components have the same weight in the constructed index, which is scaled to run between 0 and 
100. In cases where information was available for two components only, the index value was based on this 
information. We applied this strategy in order to decrease the number of missing values on the 
socioeconomic index.10 To test whether the internal structure of the index is similar across countries, we 
conducted a factor analysis for each country. The results showed very little cross-country variation. In all 
countries, data formed a one-factor solution with similar component loadings (see Appendix Table A1).  
The set of independent indicators selected to measure the size of the welfare state for testing H2, contains 
country-level data of “total tax revenue as percentage of GDP” and “total government spending as 
percentage of GDP”, both collected from the Heritage Foundation online database. As noted above, studies 
within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) area of countries show that 
both of these indicators are strongly correlated with the redistributive capacity of the welfare state.11 For 
testing H3—on the role of economic development—we use one indicator: “GDP per capita” (2006 data), 
collected from the World Bank online database.  
Results 
Attitudes toward Taxation in Thirty-Three Countries  
                                                        
8 The latent class analysis software used in this study is LatentGold 4.5. 
9 Please note that the ISCO-based component of the index is a rather rough measure in the case of South Africa and 
Venezuela, since the ISCO coding is available only as a one-digit code. 
10 The total number of valid responses for the tax items is 42,162. Out of these, 40,125 have a valid response on the 
socioeconomic index. 
11 One caveat, however, is that data covering all 33 countries were available only from 2009. However, for the countries 
where time-series data are available, an analysis shows that the levels of government spending and taxation tend to be 
rather stable between 2006 and 2009. 
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Based on the results of the LCA model testing exercise explained before, we selected the five-cluster model 
as an adequate representation of the data (for details, see Appendix, Table A2). This means that five 
dominant types of tax preferences exist in the data. What characterizes each of these and how do they 
differ across countries in popularity? Let us first begin with the characteristics of each of the five tax 
preference types, as shown in Table 1.  
The cell entries in Table 1 are item-response probabilities by cluster membership. For example, among 
those respondents classified into cluster 1, the probability to respond “for high-income earners R taxes are 
too low” is 99.8 percent, “taxes are about right” 0.1 percent, and “taxes are too high” 0.1 percent. The 
probability for cluster 1 respondents to respond “for low-income earners R taxes are too low” is 1.4 percent, 
“taxes are about right” 16.2 percent, and “taxes are too high” 82.4 percent. In other words, cluster 1 
respondents prefer a more progressive distribution of taxes: taxes on low-income earners should be 
decreased, while taxes on high-income earners should be increased. Respondents in the second cluster 
also seem to prefer a more progressive distribution of taxes, particularly when it comes to tax cuts for low-
income earners. These preference types will be labeled progressive1 (A) and progressive2 (B), 
respectively. The third cluster, content (C), comes closest to a preference pattern demonstrating 
contentment with current levels of taxation. The fourth group, called cut all (D), represents respondents 
favoring tax cuts for all income groups. Finally, the fifth cluster is composed of respondents favoring a 
higher tax burden for those with low incomes, while indicating that those with high incomes should become 
financially disburdened. This response pattern is hereafter called regressive (E).  
Table 1. Attitudes towards taxation. Characteristics of five types of tax preferences (A-E) 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 
 Progressive1 
(A) 
Progressive2 
(B) 
Content 
(C) 
Cut all 
(D) 
Regressive 
(E) 
 
For high-income earners9 
Taxes are too high 0.1 23.2 15.4 87.0 58.3 
Taxes are about right 0.1 36.5 75.8 12.9 28.9 
Taxes are too low 99.8 40.4 8.9 0.1 12.9 
For low-income earners9 
Taxes are too high 82.4 99.4 47.3 73.4 14.5 
Taxes are about right 16.2 0.0 52.3 25.2 0.4 
Taxes are too low 1.4 0.6 0.4 1.4 85.1 
Note: Cell entries are response probabilities (%) by cluster membership. (n=42,162)  
The empirical results are presented as follows. First, we will show the distribution of the five tax preferences 
per country. Thereafter follows the central empirical part of the study: the analysis of the relationship 
between socioeconomic status and attitudes toward redistributive taxation per country. Here, we have 
performed 33 single-country OLS-regressions for each of the 5 dependent variables (the 5 tax preferences) 
(in total 33*5=165 regressions). The dependent variables are cluster membership probabilities and each 
varies between 0 and 100. Apart from socioeconomic status, each regression contains 3 other independent 
variables: age, gender, and work status. These are used to control for compositional differences and are not 
of any analytical interest.  
Based on the expected patterns according to the homo-economicus theory, a series of predictability 
measures (PM) is developed. The better the regression results meet the theoretical expectations, the higher 
the country’s score on the predictability measures. These predictability measures are then used to test the 
extent to which the sizes of the predictability measures co-vary with the size of the welfare state and the 
level of economic development as specified in H2 and H3, respectively. Finally, we devote special attention 
to the countries displaying the most deviant attitude patterns. By checking question wording, translation 
issues, and sample coverage in these countries, the purpose is to analyze the extent to which these 
aberrant patterns may be caused by measurement errors related to the survey instrument, that is, data 
collection procedures.  
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Table 2: Tax Preference Cluster Sizes and Macro Indicators by Country 
 Prog
1 (A) 
Prog
2 (B) 
Conten
t (C) 
Cut 
all (D) 
Regressiv
e (E) 
(n)    
(A-E) GDP/capita 
Tax/  
GDP 
Government 
spending/GD
P 
Denmark 18.3 16.0 38.1 27.6 0.0 1,266 52,041 49.5 51.0 
Finland 29.9 26.2 37.6 6.0 0.3 1,085 41,119 43.1 47.3 
Norway 30.4 31.3 24.4 13.7 0.4 1,218 72,960 43.4 40.9 
Sweden 20.7 42.9 20.1 16.3 0.1 1,097 46,256 48.9 52.5 
 
France 42.0 3.4 29.5 20.5 4.7 1,564 36,545 45.0 52.3 
Germany 52.8 15.5 25.7 5.5 0.5 1,434 36,400 40.8 44.2 
Great Britain 19.9 16.0 42.9 19.5 1.7 830 42,448 37.9 44.0 
Ireland 47.6 3.8 28.8 19.3 0.5 952 53,941 32.5 35.7 
Netherlands 47.2 3.8 37.7 10.4 0.9 891 44,011 38.0 45.3 
Switzerland 57.0 7.7 35.1 0.0 0.1 942 57,347 29.7 32.2 
 
Croatia 19.9 71.6 8.3 0.0 0.2 940 11,360 23.4 42.0 
Israel 23.0 29.3 26.7 18.9 2.1 1,177 21,582 37.0 46.4 
Portugal 34.0 52.8 11.2 2.0 0.0 1,545 19,820 37.8 45.8 
Spain 27.5 43.5 21.6 6.1 1.3 2,078 28,481 37.9 38.8 
 
Czech Rep. 24.6 23.1 32.5 17.5 2.3 1,103 15,159 36.9 42.6 
Hungary 60.9 3.7 24.3 4.1 7.0 898 11,343 39.9 49.7 
Latvia 40.1 44.2 7.5 8.0 0.2 855 8,986 31.3 37.7 
Poland 28.8 53.7 17.1 0.0 0.4 1,115 9,002 33.5 42.1 
Slovenia 37.6 47.5 11.1 2.9 0.9 911 19,725 38.4 42.4 
Russia 44.8 28.9 23.8 0.0 2.6 1,468 6,948 34.6 33.4 
 
Australia 21.3 12.6 25.5 40.6 0.1 2,511 36,101 30.6 34.2 
Canada 34.6 0.1 27.4 34.4 3.6 796 40,245 33.3 39.1 
USA 49.5 0.0 33.6 11.5 5.5 1,379 46,437 28.3 37.4 
New Zealand 9.2 6.9 34.8 48.6 0.5 1,099 26,336 36.0 40.3 
 
Chile 14.2 63.3 14.7 2.6 5.2 1,331 9,371 18.9 18.6 
Dominican 
Rep. 2.3 85.1 8.1 0.3 4.3 1,992 3,794 15.0 18.1 
Uruguay 9.5 69.0 11.1 5.0 5.5 943 5,879 24.0 30.2 
 
Japan 52.5 15.8 16.5 7.5 7.7 963 34,076 27.9 36.0 
South Korea 79.7 0.4 12.5 5.5 2.0 1,541 20,917 28.7 28.9 
Taiwan 61.7 9.3 26.7 2.0 0.3 1,630 30,084 13.7 17.8 
 
Philippines 0.0 15.6 25.0 43.5 15.9 1,106 1,399 14.0 17.1 
South Africa 11.8 0.0 32.3 42.1 13.8 2,469 5,660 26.6 27.8 
Venezuela 9.3 27.0 31.1 11.9 20.8 1,033 6,748 17.0 35.7 
Note: A-E= Cluster sizes. GDP/capita (in USD); Total tax revenue/GDP; Total government spending/GDP 
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In Table 2, the size of each of the 5 tax preference clusters (A–E) is shown by country. Speaking about 
broader patterns across 33 very heterogeneous countries is not an easy task. However, it becomes quite 
clear that in general, support for progressive taxation (A–B) is rather strong across countries, while support 
for regressive taxation (E) is generally low.  
Focusing on the countries exhibiting the most deviant patterns compared to the majority of countries, we 
find the Philippines, South Africa, and Venezuela. In these countries, support for regressive taxation (E) is 
quite pronounced: 14 percent in South Africa, 16 percent in the Philippines, and even 21 percent in 
Venezuela. In addition, Table 2 shows that in both South Africa and the Philippines, the most common 
public preference is general tax cuts. Taken together, data suggest that these two citizenries express strong 
support for a prototypical neoliberal right-wing tax system. Taking into account the great poverty among 
large parts of the population, the above reported results are, we believe, representative of empirical findings 
where researchers have reasons to question the quality of data. We will return to this issue later. In the next 
section, we analyze the relationships between socioeconomic status and attitudes toward redistributive 
taxation in order to assess the empirical support of H1–H3. When examining the results, we will also pay 
special attention to the response patterns observed for the above three countries.  
Relationships between Socioeconomic Status and Attitudes toward Taxation in Thirty-Three 
Countries  
In Table 3, columns A–E show the effect of socioeconomic status on each of the five dependent variables 
(standardized regression coefficients) per country. In order to assess the degree of correspondence 
between the assumptions formulated in H1—a negative relationship between socioeconomic status and 
support for redistributive taxation—we have constructed a series of predictability measures displayed in the 
last three columns of Table 3. These measures are based on the regression results presented in columns 
A–E. Below follows the theoretical rationale for the design of the predictability measures, as well as how 
they are constructed.  
According to the basic homo-economicus theory, those economically less well-off should score high on the 
progressive taxation preferences (A, B) and low on preferences for general tax cuts (D) as well as on 
support for regressive taxation (E). For contented respondents (C) it is not fruitful to specify an expected 
direction of the relationship. In some countries, the “leftist” position may be to defend the current levels of 
taxation against those arguing for lowered tax rates; whereas in other countries, the dividing line may go 
between those in favor of increased taxation and those content with taxes as they are. Therefore, the actual 
sign of the contented preference coefficient is of no interest. 
The first predictability measure (PM I), measuring the strength of the association between socio-economic 
status and preferences for redistributive taxation is therefore specified as:  
[ PM I = (- betaa - betab + |betac| + betad + betae)*100 ] 
However, in order to check the robustness of the results we have designed two complementary measures. 
The second predictability measure, PM II, includes only significant beta coefficients (10% level) and for PM 
III, only the three strongest beta coefficients are included. The theoretical rationale underlying PM III is that 
the number of dominant lines of political conflict over tax policy in most countries is likely to be limited.  
Columns A and B in Table 3 display the associations between socioeconomic position and attitudes toward 
progressive taxation. While it is theoretically expected that both of these relationships should be negative, 
we find that this “twin pattern” occurs only in 19 out of 33 countries, and in some cases only one relationship 
is significant. It is, however, worth underlining that virtually all of the North and West European countries 
display this twin pattern (except Great Britain). In the remaining 14 countries, we find either combinations of 
positive and negative associations with progressive taxation, or—in a small number of countries: the 
Philippines, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Hungary—no significant relationships at all.  
When it comes to the relationship between socioeconomic position and the likelihood of preferring a smaller 
welfare state by reducing taxes—and thereby the decreasing redistributive capacity of the state—in a 
majority of countries the expected positive relationship cannot be observed (column D). In 16 countries, the 
relationship is nonsignificant and in 4 countries it is significantly negative, that is, the support for general tax 
cuts comes disproportionally from the lower strata on the socioeconomic ladder. In thirteen countries, 
however, we can observe the expected significant positive relationship.  
In column C, the focus is on those who are content with the income tax. We can observe a predominantly 
positive relationship between socioeconomic position and tax contentment in most of the countries, 
although the magnitude of the relationship varies substantially. Most of the pronounced relationships pertain 
to relatively affluent and advanced welfare states.  
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Table 3: Attitudes towards taxation by socio-economic status in thirty-three countries 
  A B C D E PM I* PM II** PM III*** 
  
Prog
1 
Prog
2  
Conte
nt  
Cut 
all 
Regressi
ve 
   
Expected 
direction - - || + +   
Denmark -17.0 -21.2 3.9 19.8 0.5 62.4 58.0 58.0 
Finland -25.3 -19.3 26.9 23.2 -1.7 93.0 94.7 75.4 
Norway -10.2 -14.7 19.1 1.9 7.1 52.9 51.1 44.0 
Sweden -27.5 -13.9 12.9 31.0 -2.6 82.8 85.4 72.4 
       
  
France -11.0 -19.5 6.0 2.1 16.1 54.6 52.5 46.5 
Germany -10.6 -16.4 20.6 1.3 -2.2 46.8 47.7 47.7 
Great Britain 0.5 -19.1 8.7 -4.1 1.7 24.9 27.9 23.7 
Ireland -2.1 -13.2 13.6 -11.0 5.3 23,2 15.8 15.8 
Netherlands -25.4 -19.4 20.3 18.7 7.6 91.4 91.4 65.1 
Switzerland -11.9 -4.4 13.4 2.9 6.6 39.2 31.9 31.9 
       
  
Croatia 1.4 -6.5 6.3 1.7 -4.7 8.4 12.8 8.1 
Israel -9.9 -16.0 11.3 7.6 6.6 51.3 51.3 37.2 
Portugal -3.0 -7.6 12.6 0.7 1.2 25.1 20.2 23.2 
Spain -5.3 -9.7 15.0 -0.3 -3.5 26.2 29.9 29.9 
       
  
Czech Rep. -22.5 -10.4 14.8 16.1 2.9 66.5 63.7 53.3 
Hungary 0.0 3.0 -2.0 2.5 1.2 2.7 0.0 1.5 
Latvia 1.2 -7.1 3.4 3.9 -0.3 12.8 7.1 14.4 
Poland -20.1 6.3 14.2 15.3 1.0 44.3 43.2 49.5 
Slovenia -7.9 -7.1 15.8 17.9 -7.4 41.3 41.3 41.7 
Russia 4.4 -8.7 1.8 -3.1 -1.8 1.2 8.7 1.2 
       
  
Australia 0.1 -12.4 11.4 -5.6 1.6 19.6 18.2 18.2 
Canada -11.4 -14.7 6.0 6.5 4.4 43.1 32.7 32.7 
USA 0.5 -21.0 2.8 -5.1 -0.7 17.5 15.9 18.7 
New Zealand -11.8 -17.4 0.6 9.9 0.4 40.0 39.0 39.0 
       
  
Chile 4.5 -11.0 13.7 3.0 -6.1 17.1 18.6 18.6 
Dominican 
Rep. 5.0 -3.2 -0.1 0.9 2.8 2.0 -5.0 1.0 
Uruguay 0.5 4.6 -0.7 6.7 -9.2 -6.9 -2.5 -7.1 
       
  
Japan -5.5 -7.3 3.0 6.2 6.7 28.7 20.2 20.2 
South Korea -8.3 -2.2 4.1 9.1 4.2 27.9 17.4 21.6 
Taiwan 12.3 -12.9 -9.6 -8.0 1.9 4.2 2.2 10.2 
       
  
Philippines 1.8 4.9 1.7 4.5 -9.4 -9.9 -9.4 -9.9 
South Africa -4.1 -9.4 7.5 1.5 -6.3 16.2 14.7 10.6 
Venezuela 1.3 3.4 8.5 -2.6 -8.8 -7.7 -0.4 -3.8 
Notes: Cell entries in columns A–E are standardized regression coefficients *100. PM I–III are predictability 
measures. PM I–III: * = All five beta coefficients included; ** = only significant (10 percent level) beta 
coefficients are included; *** = only the three strongest beta coefficients are included. Bold coefficients are 
significant (10 percent level). Age, gender, and work status are included as independent variables but not 
shown. Numbers in columns A–E are rounded. N=42,125.  
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Finally, as shown previously in Table 2, the proportion of people supporting a more regressive distribution of 
taxes is quite small in most countries, which to some extent may explain why the association between 
socioeconomic position and attitudes toward regressive taxation is nonsignificant in a large number of 
countries (Table 3, column E). Two findings are worth emphasizing. First, the expected positive relationship 
is manifested in six countries only. Second, in the three countries where regressive tax preferences have 
shown to be particularly common—the Philippines, Venezuela, and South Africa—we observe a negative 
significant relationship: the lower the socioeconomic position the higher the support for a more regressive 
distribution of taxes. 
The empirical results in Table 3 demonstrate that the similarity between the theoretically expected 
relationship and empirical observations varies extensively across countries. We will now examine the extent 
to which the size of the welfare state and the level of economic development “explain” this variation.  
In Table 4, the correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r) between the two indicators of the size of the welfare 
state, as well as the indicator of economic development, and each of the three predictability measures are 
displayed. The associations are quite strong and positive indicating that the strength of the expected 
relationships between socioeconomic position and attitudes toward redistributive taxation co-vary with the 
size of the welfare state and the level of economic development.  
Table 4: Associations between Predictability Measures (PM I-III) and Macro Indicators  
 PM I PM II PM III 
Total tax revenue/GDP   74 75 76  
Total government spending/GDP   65 67 66 
GDP/capita   58 54 57 
Notes: Cell entries are correlation coefficients*100 (Pearson’s r)(n=33); All correlations are  
significant at the 1 percent level.  
The results indicate that the expected relationships between socioeconomic position and attitudes toward 
redistributive taxation are far more often met for the Western, especially the North European countries, than 
for the less affluent non-Western countries. The predictability score is substantially lower for this latter group 
of countries. Uruguay, Venezuela, and the Philippines even report a negative score on all three variants of 
the predictability measure.  
Overall, the results suggest that the fit between theory and empirics is much better in affluent Western 
compared to less affluent non-Western countries. Moreover, within the latter group, the structure of the 
observed patterns shows a much larger cross-country variation. Arguably, some of the results cause 
suspicions about the quality of data. This relates in particular to the empirical results for the Philippines, 
Venezuela, and South Africa. In the next section we take a closer look at these three countries by 
examining issues related to translation and sample coverage.  
Venezuela, South Africa, and the Philippines: Measurement Errors Related to Translation or Sample 
Coverage?  
In this section we focus on the three countries in which preferences toward taxation are strikingly different 
from those in the other examined countries. In these countries, many respondents believe that the poor 
should carry a higher share of the tax burden, and that taxes on those with higher incomes should be 
lowered. Even more peculiar, the data reveal that a surprisingly large share of respondents embracing 
these views does not belong to the upper classes of society. On the contrary, they are, in fact, rather poor 
themselves. First, we examine potential errors related to translation. Second, we examine sample coverage 
focusing on the representation of the poor in the samples.  
The translation process of converting the British English ISSP source questionnaire into native languages 
can produce errors (Harkness, Villar, and Edwards 2010b; Smith 2011; Weisberg 2005; Willis et al. 2010). 
The used tax items use a five-point scale ranging from [taxes are] “much too high” to “much too low.” 
Although the ISSP Working Principles (ISSP Research Group 2012) state that primary researchers in all 
participating countries must oversee an appropriate translation into the national language/languages, a 
simple translation error reversing response categories could produce the observed patterns.12 
                                                        
12 ISSP Working Principles: “non-literal translations, that is, ‘culturally equivalent questions,’ are to be notified to the 
group and indicated in the documentation.” Apart from that there are no mandatory rules for the procedure of the 
translation process. 
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This seems a plausible source of error especially for the Philippines and South Africa because in both 
countries the ISSP 2006 survey was conducted in six different languages, with uneven numbers of 
respondents using the various questionnaires.13 Reversing the direction of the response scale in a dominant 
language could be enough to cause outcomes that look like high levels of support for regressive taxation. 
Moreover, since it is likely that many of those involved in the data processing do not understand all of these 
languages, possible mistakes may not be easily discovered.  
For South Africa and Venezuela this potential error can be excluded on the basis of language checks 
conducted by native speakers.14 Thus, the response patterns do not seem to be caused by errors in either 
translation or wording in these two countries. For examining the Philippines data we obtained a variable 
from the national data set indicating the language in which the interview was conducted.15  
An analysis of the response patterns across language groups shows that three of five language groups 
have a somewhat larger probability of holding nonredistributive tax preferences. However, the probability 
that a translation error would appear in three languages simultaneously seems unlikely. Besides, if such a 
massive translation error were true, the support for nonredistributive taxation would most certainly be much 
stronger than it actually is in the Philippines. In our judgment, the results for Philippines do not seem to 
depend on translation errors.  
Another source of error worth considering is the respondent selection issue, in this case a sample coverage 
error. Such an error could be responsible for the data outcome (Heeringa and O’Muircheartaigh 2010). 
Coverage errors generate bias due to the omission of non-covered sample units (Weisberg 2005). The 
Philippines, South Africa, and Venezuela have large areas of informal settlements with significant numbers 
of poor people making a living outside the formal economy (Perazzi, Merli, and Paredes 2010; Schneider 
2002; Wills 2009). It is easy to imagine that sampling procedures and/or interview situations might be 
difficult in such areas. If these areas are not covered in the sample, the number of respondents belonging to 
the poorest classes of society would be severely underestimated; the very same classes that have the 
strongest reasons for supporting a more redistributive tax policy.  
Moving beyond the obligatory methodological report on interview situations in informal settlements, we 
queried the primary researchers about this issue. We received responses from the Philippines and 
Venezuela and the researchers assured us that these areas had been covered. Interviewers in the 
Philippines were given special training on area coverage, and coverage of slum areas was said to not pose 
much of a problem. In Venezuela a number of people in poor districts were employed as field staff, which 
facilitated access to the dangerous zones as they lived there themselves and knew how to operate in these 
areas.  
The sample coverage issue was also approached from another angle, using national statistics in order to 
assess the percentage of the population living below the subsistence level.16 For each country, the obtained 
estimate was thereafter compared with the income distribution in the country sample.17 The national specific 
family income variable and household size were used to determine the equivalence income.18 
Beginning with the Philippines, official statistics estimate the subsistence threshold line in 2006 to be 
PHP835 per month, and 15 percent of the general population is below this line.19 In the ISSP sample, we 
                                                        
13 The languages covered by the Philippine survey are English, Tagalog, Ilocano, Bicolano, Ilonggo, and Cebuano. In 
South Africa the languages are English, Afrikaans, Venda, Xhosa, Zulu, and Tsonga. According to the ISSP Study 
Monitoring Report (Scholz et al. 2008), all translations were carried out by trained translators and checked by language 
experts. 
14 Here we would like to thank Ivet Solanes Ros and Webster Whande for their support. 
15 Thanks to Gerado A. Sandoval from the Social Weather Stations in the Philippines. 
16 The poverty and subsistence thresholds, respectively, are absolute figures, comprising people who cannot afford to 
buy a national specific minimum basket of goods. The subsistence threshold lies even below the poverty line and 
indicates the very minimum level of what a person needs to survive. The definitions of these levels are set by the 
countries. 
17 We are aware that there are additional dimensions of poverty that cannot be comprehended by measuring pure 
income levels. Furthermore, there exist different income-based measures of poverty as well as poverty lines (see, e.g., 
Ravallion 2010). Apart from that, in urban economies with large informal sectors, income flows may be erratic. The same 
is true for agrarian economies where household incomes rely on the harvest cycle (Coudouel, Hentschel, and Wodon 
2002). Nevertheless, the comparison of income statistics with the income information in the survey data should be 
sufficient to figure out whether an entire group of the society might be excluded from the survey. 
18 Incomes tend to be underestimated in surveys, especially with only one income question, because respondents simply 
forget to include all income sources (DAE 1998). However, that does not account for those respondents living at the 
existence minimum. Those who have very little, are usually able to keep track of it. Since the age structure of the 
household members is unknown, the following formula was used: equivalence income ¼ family income / (household size 
* 0.73). (For further information regarding the construction of equivalence income see DAE [1998].)  
19 National Statistical Coordination Board, Philippines, 2006. 
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find that 12.5 percent of the sample is below the line. Thus, differences between the two estimates are quite 
small or at least not large enough to explain the high support for regressive taxation in the Philippines.  
For South Africa, we can only apply a quite rough measure of the poverty rate. First, the income information 
in the South African ISSP sample is available only in the form of income classes. The official subsistence 
threshold line identifies a specific income value. Second, the ISSP income variable has a high nonresponse 
rate (27 percent), thus making it difficult to judge the extent to which the sample is representative of the 
population in terms of income distribution.  
Various possible poverty measures for South Africa can be found in the literature. For our purposes, the 
most suitable measure found was “the necessary amount of money to purchase enough food to meet the 
basic daily food-energy requirements for an average person in South Africa over one month.” In 2005, it 
was estimated to be ZAR250.20 Based on these facts, we decided to use the lowest income class available 
in the ISSP data (ZAR250 per month) as the threshold. Although prerequisites are not ideal, the analysis 
should reveal whether the poor are severely underrepresented. According to official statistics, the poverty 
rate in 2006 was 23 percent. Our estimate on the ISSP sample shows a poverty rate close to 25 percent. 
The ISSP sample thus comes fairly close to representing the poor population of South Africa.  
In Venezuela, INE (Instituto Nacional De Estadística) data differentiate between poor and extremely poor 
people. As done for the Philippines and South Africa we focus on the group of extremely poor. In Venezuela 
the percentage of the population belonging to this category is calculated on the basis of a basket of goods. 
Since these data do not contain any specific monetary value, a direct comparison of official statistics and 
ISSP data is not possible. Nevertheless, to get an idea of the proportions, we applied the World Bank’s 
international poverty line of USD 1.25 per day as a rough estimate. Based on this estimate, the ISSP data 
underestimate the poverty rate for Venezuela, by four percentage units (8 percent compared to 12 percent). 
This result also does not suggest that the collected data severely misrepresent the actual socioeconomic 
structure in Venezuela.  
In sum, it seems that the observed aberrant response patterns in Venezuela, South Africa, and the 
Philippines are not related to obvious translation errors, such as reversed response scales, or to sample 
coverage.21 
Conclusion 
Beginning with a simple rational choice-inspired homo-economicus hypothesis saying that those who are 
better off in the socioeconomic hierarchy should have less reason to support state-organized economic 
redistribution compared to those situated at the lower levels in the socioeconomic hierarchy, this article set 
out to empirically study the relationships between socioeconomic status and attitudes toward redistributive 
taxation across 33 countries.  
The empirical results demonstrated substantial cross-country variation regarding the correspondence 
between empirical observations and theoretical expectations. In some countries, the relationships between 
socioeconomic position and attitudes toward redistributive taxation were clearly in line with expectations. 
However, in many countries, relationships were weak and in some countries, even inverted.  
When faced with such tremendous cross-national variation in response patterns, a common strategy among 
researchers is to question the quality of the data and data collection procedures for the countries deviating 
strongly from theoretical expectations. Somewhat bluntly put, this “questioning” can be expressed in two 
different ideal-typical strategies: implicit questioning (avoiding use of the data) or explicit questioning (using 
the data, and basically arguing that it is bad data). The strategy chosen in this study was very different and 
quite uncommon in cross-national attitude research. Our main argument was that cross-national variation in 
attitudes as a phenomenon may point to theory limitations in terms of generalization, that is, that the chosen 
theory may be more valid in some countries than in others. In other words, the lack of fit between theory 
and empirical observations may be rooted in problems related to theory rather than the quality of data 
collection procedures.  
Building on insights and results from previous research we formulated two “cultural distance” hypotheses, 
both arguing that the correspondence between the homo-economicus theory and empirics should indeed 
vary systematically across countries. The first one focused on the role of the welfare state and institutional 
feedback effects on public opinion and suggested that the more encompassing the welfare state, the 
                                                        
20 The Presidency of South Africa (2008) Development Indicators 2008: Van der Berg (2007) based on AMPS of various 
years (1993–2007), Bhorat (2007) based on Statistics SA IES data (1995, 2000, and 2005), and Statistics South Africa 
and National Treasury (2007:23). ZAR stands for South African Rand. 
21 Further analyses have been done taking into account different regions and therewith different regional subsistence 
lines for the Philippines and South Africa. The results do not change the cross-regional data outcomes.  
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stronger the correlation between socioeconomic status and redistributive taxation. The second hypothesis, 
related more to the level of economic affluence and associated scientific dominance across countries, 
stated that the higher the level of economic development in a country, the stronger the correlation between 
socioeconomic status and redistributive taxation. Both of these hypotheses received considerable empirical 
support. The relationship between socioeconomic status and support for redistributive taxation was found to 
be substantially stronger in the wealthy Western welfare states—particularly among those of Northern 
Europe—than in the poor non-Western countries lacking any institutional design reminiscent of a welfare 
state.  
For some countries—the Philippines, Venezuela, and South Africa—the empirical results deviated from 
theoretical expectations to such an extent that we felt compelled to perform in-depth analyses of some key 
aspects of the data collection procedures in these countries regarding translation and sample coverage. 
However, we did not find any clear evidence that the observed results were rooted in measurement errors 
related to either translation or sample coverage. Moreover, when keeping in mind that the apparent misfit 
between the homo-economicus theory and empirics relates to virtually all of the rather poor non-Western 
countries, explanations related to measurement error in the data collection procedures used in the 
Philippines, South Africa, and Venezuela seem even less plausible.  
To conclude, we believe that the results in this study show that socioeconomic indicators such as income, 
education, and occupational status are relevant factors explaining public support for state-organized 
economic redistribution in many of the Western countries, but not in the poor non-Western countries. What 
are the broader implications of this finding? In the context of this study, we would like to stress that 
theoretically deviant empirical observations in cross-national research may not be related to bad data 
quality, but to theory generalization limitations. The weak correspondence between the homo-economicus 
theory and empirics observed in most of the non-Western countries may indicate that Western theoretical 
assumptions are simply not valid.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Socioeconomic Index: Principal Component Factor Analysis Using Varimax Rotation  
Country Education Family Income ISEI    Variance in % 
Denmark 0.79 0.70 0.85 61.1 
Finland 0.84 0.68 0.85 62.8 
Norway 0.77 0.73 0.84 61.1 
Sweden 0.79 0.70 0.83 60.0 
     
France 0.79 0.78 0.84 64.4 
Germany 0.86 0.70 0.87 66.2 
Great Britain 0.79 0.77 0.83 63.3 
Ireland 0.84 0.70 0.84 63.6 
Netherlands 0.77 0.72 0.83 59.6 
Switzerland 0.87 0.63 0.88 64.2 
     
Croatia 0.87 0.74 0.88 69.2 
Israel 0.83 0.59 0.85 58.9 
Portugal 0.84 0.72 0.86 65.2 
Spain 0.83 0.79 0.86 68.7 
     
Czech Rep. 0.89 0.61 0.89 65.3 
Hungary 0.87 0.63 0.87 63.6 
Latvia 0.82 0.62 0.88 60.9 
Poland 0.88 0.73 0.88 69.1 
Slovenia 0.87 0.81 0.90 74.2 
Russia 0.79 0.62 0.84 57.2 
     
Australia 0.75 0.71 0.78 55.9 
Canada 0.71 0.61 0.78 49.5 
USA 0.79 0.78 0.82 63.5 
New Zealand 0.73 0.67 0.78 53.1 
     
Chile 0.83 0.79 0.86 68.1 
Dominican Rep. 0.80 0.72 0.84 62.0 
Uruguay 0.86 0.81 0.89 72.8 
     
Japan 0.78 0.73 0.80 58.9 
South Korea 0.82 0.79 0.86 67.4 
Taiwan 0.82 0.77 0.85 66.7 
     
Philippines 0.78 0.71 0.84 60.1 
South Africa 0.85 0.76 0.85 67.5 
Venezuela 0.82 0.77 0.68 57.7 
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Table A2:  Model fit statistics (n=42,162) 
Model L² CAIC (L²) df L² reduction % 
1 12679.4 9650.6 260 0.0 
2 5536.3 2938.5 223 56.3 
3 3316.1 1149.3 186 73.8 
4 1834.7 99.0 149 85.5 
5 877.7 -427.1 112 93.1 
6 452.1 -421.6 75 96.4 
Notes: The L2 value of model 1 (the 1-cluster model), the baseline model, indicates the maximum 
association between the manifest variables that can be explained by any latent class variable. Judging by 
the consistent Akaike information criterion statistic (CAIC) (the lower the value, the better the model), the 
baseline model should be rejected in favor of a more complex model (Kankaras, Moors, and Vermunt 
2011). By relying on the CAIC statistic, it is suggested that the five-cluster model should be chosen (model 
5). The L2 value is reduced by 93.1 percent. Furthermore, and very important for a good model fit, the three 
error correlations (i.e., bivariate residuals that the latent variable does not account for) between the manifest 
variables are all nonsignificant (table available on request). 
